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Abstract
A central problem in designing effective models of provider governance in health systems has been to ensure 
an appropriate balance between the concerns of public sector and/or government decision-makers, on the one 
hand, and of non-governmental health services actors in civil society and private life, on the other. In tax-funded 
European health systems up to the 1980s, the state and other public sector decision-makers played a dominant 
role over health service provision, typically operating hospitals through national or regional governments on 
a command-and-control basis. In a number of countries, however, this state role has started to change, with 
governments first stepping out of direct service provision and now de facto pushed to focus more on steering 
provider organizations rather than on direct public management. In this new approach to provider governance, 
the state has pulled back into a regulatory role that introduces market-like incentives and management 
structures, which then apply to both public and private sector providers alike. This article examines some of 
the main operational complexities in implementing this new governance reality/strategy, specifically from a 
service provision (as opposed to mostly a financing or even regulatory) perspective. After briefly reviewing 
some of the key theoretical dilemmas, the paper presents two case studies where this new approach was put 
into practice: primary care in Sweden and hospitals in Spain. The article concludes that good governance today 
needs to reflect practical operational realities if it is to have the desired effect on health sector reform outcome. 
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I. Introduction 
Strengthening governance in the health services provider 
sector is a complex endeavor. It involves balancing the multiple 
conflicting logics and interests of patients, staff, citizens, and 
politicians as well as other stakeholders, all while the focus on 
improving access, quality and safety, and on health outcomes, 
responsiveness and system performance is not lost. 
One of the central dilemmas in designing new provider 
models of governance has been to re-think the appropriate 
decision-making balance between the public sector and/or 
government, on the one hand, and the various actors in civil 
society and private non-governmental life, on the other. While 
in Europe (the case of the United States, Canada, or Asian 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
[OECD] countries is slightly different) this shift in thinking 
has been underway in social health insurance-based health 
systems as well (particularly the Netherlands), it has been 
most apparent in the predominantly tax-funded health 
systems of Northern and Southern Europe, as well as – since 
1991 – in the hybrid state-run social insurance models that 
have emerged in Central Europe.1
Up to the 1970s and 1980s, the state and other public sector 
decision-makers in tax-funded health systems played a 
dominant role over health service provision, typically 
operating hospitals through national or regional governments 
on a command-and-control basis. More recently, however, this 
role has changed in a growing number of countries, with states 
now focusing more on steering rather than on direct public 
management of health sector provider organizations. In this 
new approach, the state has pulled back into a supervisory 
and regulatory role, from which it introduces market-like 
incentives and management structures that apply to both 
public and private sector providers alike, and which tend to 
be reimbursed based on measures of effective performance 
and/or citizen choice of provider.2,3 
The post-2008 economic crisis in Europe has further 
reinforced this shift in direction, highlighting a new situation 
in which the earlier type of state or public sector predominance 
is increasingly less financially or institutionally sustainable.4-6 
As part of this changed state role, it also has become necessary 
to re-assess the appropriate role for elected politicians, and to 
re-calibrate broad governmental strategies of governance and 
stewardship to better reflect day-to-day operational decision-
making in what has become an organizationally more diverse 
provider environment.7
Embedded within this core organizing dilemma have been 
continual concerns about quality, responsiveness, and, in 
some contexts, access, regarding wholly publicly operated 
service providers. In both primary care and hospital sectors, 
public command and control structures of organization 
have lagged (sometimes dramatically) behind patient and 
citizen expectations.8-10 Reasons for this less-than-optimal 
behavior have been complex and intertwined.11 While specific 
problems are often closely tied to national context and cultural 
characteristics, other important factors frequently include (1) 
the difficulty of maintaining consistently executed and timely 
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capital investment in new equipment and/or procedures; (2) 
a demonstrated lack of innovative and or entrepreneurial 
clinical initiatives; (3) poor incentives embedded in fixed 
salary and work rule arrangements reflecting politically 
powerful yet risk-adverse public sector employee unions; and 
(4) erratic and often politically short-term interference in 
meso level institutional management by (depending on the 
country) elected national/regional/local political actors as 
well as, where the national government plays an operational 
role, senior Ministry staff.12-19
This article will examine key dimensions of how effectively 
this new strategic approach to governing health providers has 
been applied in two tax-funded European health systems; in 
both cases, the changing nature of the state’s role is highlighted, 
and the complexity involved in changing governance strategies 
is explored. The next section frames the current governance 
debate in terms of the practical structural alternatives that 
policy-makers have to choose from by presenting two case 
studies: primary care in Sweden and hospitals in Spain. By 
exploring new patterns for two different subsectors of tax-
based provider systems, the article provides a broader view 
of the process of structural change that is currently underway. 
The article finishes by observing that good governance cannot 
be reduced to a set of arbitrary bureaucratic rules but rather 
needs to be grounded in the day to day operational level if it 
is to have the desired effect on health sector reform outcome.
Two caveats should be noted. The first is that, as already 
indicated, the paper does not focus on the financing side of 
health systems, nor on the different institutions that compose 
that part of the health system. While provider institutions 
certainly respond to the differing financial incentives that 
different types of funding structures may generate, and clearly 
those financial incentives influence the overall governance 
framework for these provider organizations, this paper limits 
itself to exploring the new structural and organizational 
models of service delivery institutions per se.
The second caveat is that this article explores these new 
models of provider side governance in the social, political, 
and cultural context of specifically European healthcare 
systems. It does not seek to compare European models with 
those found in other, quite different institutional and cultural 
contexts in for example OECD countries in North America 
or Asia. While such a comparison could shed interesting light 
upon the degree to which these tentative European models are 
innovative and successful, such a cross-cultural comparison is 
beyond the scope of this analysis at this stage.
II. Framing the Governance Debate
The concept of governance in health systems has had several 
different interpretations. It was first indirectly put forward in 
World Health Organization’s (WHO’s) World Health Report, 
published in 2000, which prescribed governance as the 
fundamental responsibility of national governments to steer 
their health systems in accordance with WHO’s understanding 
of good levels of population health.20 Academic scholarship 
drew on broader political science models of governance, 
to include not just the stewardship responsibilities of duly 
constituted national, regional, and local government but 
also a wide range of actions by other non-governmental 
actors that influence the behavior and outcome of health 
system activity.21-23
Adapting this political science perspective, Duran et al24 point 
at the emergence of non-state actors who have a structurally 
important set of functions beside the formal organs of 
government that play a previously (but no longer) hegemonic 
role. They understand the definition of governance in the 
health sector as taking place at the three traditional levels 
of macro, meso, and micro. Macro would mostly consist of 
national-level policy-making functions, meso would consist 
of institutional-level decision-making functions, while micro 
would concern operational issues at the clinic or physician 
office level. All three levels are now rather blurred but at 
meso and micro levels, in particular, management as well as 
policy decisions become inexorably intertwined as part of 
institutional governance.
As a point of reference for the discussion below, the meso-
level definition of governance of hospitals is as follows:
“A set of processes and tools related to decision-making 
in steering the totality of institutional activity, influencing 
most major aspects of organizational behavior and 
recognizing the complex relationships between multiple 
stakeholders. Its scope ranges from normative values 
(equity, ethics) to access, quality, patient responsiveness, 
and patient safety dimensions. It also incorporates 
political, financial, managerial as well as daily operational 
issues.”24
The definition of meso-level governance for large primary 
health centers would be similar in breadth, content and focus. 
In this paper, the analysis of governance focuses on the meso 
level, both inside specific hospitals – in Spain – and – in 
the Swedish case study – large primary health centers. By 
following two different types of care (hospital and primary 
care) in two quite different tax-funded healthcare systems, it 
becomes possible to identify some initial patterns where these 
governance arrangements are more adequate/successful and 
where they are less so.
Since 1990, the search for new “models” of meso-level 
provider governance in tax-funded European countries and 
also in Central European state-run hybrid social insurance 
systems has taken three different although structurally 
parallel directions. Each of these three provider model 
arrangements seeks to reduce the range and negative influence 
of the above-noted factors on provider performance, and to 
encourage higher standard, more responsive, accessible, and 
efficient medical services. Given that much of the distortion 
of performance noted earlier reflects the contradictory 
objectives inherent in the conflicting logics and rationalities of 
competing health sector power groups (physicians, patients, 
politicians, and employee unions), it is important to note that 
the core governance issue for these three new models cannot 
be to permanently resolve those conflicting lines of interest 
and authority, but rather to negotiate downward the more 
malign longer term consequences in each case.
Reform model/pattern #1 has sought to broaden the portfolio 
of policy options within the public sector itself. The core effort 
has been to develop new provider management strategies 
which, although operating under the state umbrella and within 
the regulatory structure of the governmental sector, would 
have a sufficient degree of independent decision-making 
so as to reduce the negative bureaucratic consequences of 
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traditional governmental delivery.10,25 This approach has 
been adopted in the hospital sector in a number of countries 
including England, Norway, Portugal, and Spain with varying 
structural characteristics and with varying degrees of semi-
autonomous governance.1
Reform model/pattern #2 for re-structuring governance 
of providers has been to reach outside the existing public 
sector to encourage the establishment of new private, mostly 
for-profit actors and entities, typically in primary and home 
care services but occasionally also in the hospital sector. 
This effort has occurred particularly in Sweden, Norway, 
Denmark, and also Finland.26,27 Also a number of different 
development strategies have been tested, including to a certain 
extent mixed private-public models with private finance but 
public ownership and regulatory oversight of operational 
management (Private Finance Initiative in England as well as 
the Alzira Model in Valencia).
Reform model/pattern #3 combines reform models/patterns 
#1 and #2 into a mixed public-private provider market. In 
this diverse pluralist approach, semi-autonomous public 
institutions compete for patients and/or contracts with new 
and/or existing privately owned providers. This third, mixed 
approach has been encouraged in hybrid tax and social health 
insurance systems in Central Europe including Estonia15 and 
Czech Republic,16 as well as in Israel’s complex mix of public, 
not-for-profit private and for-profit private hospitals13 and 
somewhat less so in England.
Each of these three different approaches to re-structuring 
provider governance presents advantages and disadvantages, 
and each has had its difficulties in design, implementation, 
and in sustainability – this last particularly in preventing 
political authorities from seeking to re-exert direct control. 
A number of theoretical frameworks have been suggested for 
addressing these governance dilemmas.2,28-30
This configuration of new models is, however, curiously 
attenuated. The search thus far has focused on less politically 
constricted approaches inside the public sector, as well as on 
various types of openly profit-making private arrangements 
at the other end of the organizational spectrum. What thus 
far remains significantly under-developed in tax-funded 
European health systems is what previously existed in the 
middle of the spectrum – namely privately organized yet 
not-for-profit managed provider entities. These not-for-
profit agencies typically reflect a wide variety of civil society 
elements, including religious, civic, community, employee, 
and also patient-based organizations, all founded and 
managed by non-state, non-governmental, non-public-sector 
actors. This middle range of provider institutions-based in 
private civil society organizations, although it once fulfilled a 
central role in most European countries in the form of mutual 
aid societies, religious-run hospitals and nursing homes, and 
other similar community-based organizations,31 no longer 
has a noticeable presence in predominantly tax-funded health 
systems, where the state and/or local governments have taken 
over nearly all of the service delivery functions. While some 
efforts have been made to resurrect this private non-profit 
sector in England, complicated present-day public sector 
contracting and procurement rules often militate against 
the ability of small non-profit organizations to participate 
successfully.32
In short, in addition to the three new governance models/
patterns discussed above, a (most likely supplemental) fourth 
one relying on the missing not-for-profit private institutions 
could help resolve some of the structural dilemmas that 
accompany either state operated institutions or for-
profit private providers. At least in principle, non-profit 
organizations would help generate broader decision-making 
and policy participation across the society being served, 
greater transparency, clearer and more direct accountability 
to patients and citizens, and greater institutional flexibility 
and integrity.31,32 They also could introduce a higher level of 
pluralistic contestability, enabling patients to choose among 
different alternative provider systems that compete for patient 
custom to provide better quality and more timely care.
The ongoing experimentation with the three healthcare 
provider patterns detailed above, as well as the additional 
potential contribution of not-for-profit private actors, serves 
to underscore the extent to which health sector governance 
decisions in European health systems now extend beyond the 
role of formally constituted government alone. As suggested, 
to the degree that various private sector institutions are 
involved in stewardship and governance, these functions, in 
practice, have become shared zones of authority in which 
public sector government needs to accommodate the explicit 
expectations of private sector civil society actors in its own 
day-to-day behavior and activity. 
Further, conversely, this symbiotic relationship between 
public and private sector governance roles raises a question as 
to whether government’s overall legitimacy in the governance 
and stewardship of health systems has become to some extent 
dependent on the implied consent of civil society through its 
separate institutions and activities.33
This vision of a shared governance role leads to a second 
question, which is the focus of the two case studies in the next 
section of this paper: how best to operationalize such joint 
governance responsibilities in health system structures, and 
the degree to which recent experience in developing new 
provider models can point toward lessons and potentially 
more effective strategies in the future. Here it may be 
useful to point out that at the meso level of governance, 
the admixture of managerial decision-making with policy-
tied issues of multiple stakeholders results in two different 
types of performance indicators. While traditional, mostly 
macro-level concerns about equity and access remain valid 
at the meso level, a key meso-level focus is on the internal 
operational factors that actually produce and deliver services: 
the day-to-day efficiency and effectiveness of clinical teams, 
departments, and clinics, for example. The presentation of the 
two case studies that follow below emphasizes these structural 
and operational dimensions of this process of meso-level 
governance.
III. Two Provider-Side Cases Studies
The two case studies below illustrate the complexity involved 
in setting up and developing these new public and mixed 
public-private provider models. Although the Swedish 
and Spanish health systems differ on a range of important 
organizational, social, and cultural parameters, they were 
selected because they each in their own way illustrate the 
multi-faceted nature of the operational reforms that tax-
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funded health systems in Europe are attempting to achieve, 
and the difficult governance issues that arise despite 
governments of different political perspectives introducing 
reforms with the best of intentions. The first case considers 
Sweden’s experience with broadening a publicly operated 
set of primary health centers into a diverse set of differently 
configured and differently owned service providers.34 
The second case reviews Spanish attempts to re-configure 
public hospital governance into several variants of semi-
autonomous decision-making arrangements.12 Despite 
contrasting in formal structure, the two cases reinforce each 
other by demonstrating the degree of complexity involved in 
re-configuring how meso-level governance is conceived and 
executed in contemporary healthcare systems[1-3]. 
A. Diversifying Primary Care Provision in Sweden
A.1. Background
In Sweden today, the 21 counties (including 3 larger regions) 
own, operate, and (via county taxes) provide the predominant 
share of funding for an extensive network of public primary 
healthcare centers as well as district, tertiary, and university 
hospitals. Primary care physicians in Sweden (like Swedish 
hospital physicians) are unionized employees of the county 
council where they work, different from private primary care 
general practitioners in Denmark, Norway, and England, as 
well as in continental social insurance-based health systems, 
including many Central European countries as well. Sweden’s 
289 municipal governments, since Parliament’s passage of the 
1992 ADEL (“Elderly”) Reform, are responsible for public 
nursing homes as well as home care services. The national 
government’s health sector responsibility is exercised through 
broadly-written “frame” legislation as well as through a 
number of national agencies including the National Board 
of Health and Welfare and several ongoing statistical surveys 
which assess service quality and outcomes.35
The Swedish state’s role in structuring primary care services 
extends back to the late 1700s, when King Gustaf III granted 
royal commissions to primary care doctors who agreed to 
see all patients in their area who needed care.36,37 In 1955, a 
national health insurance system was introduced that covered 
all office-based visits for Swedish citizens, and in 1973 the 
Parliament passed a primary care act that encouraged the 
then-26 elected county councils to establish public primary 
health centers to provide comprehensive care to their entire 
population.38
By the mid-1980s, the effort to construct a fully public 
primary care system, built up around large primary health 
centers staffed by physicians, nurses, health educators, and 
social workers, had become controversial. On the one hand, 
these health centers performed well when assessed in terms 
of aggregate population-based measures.39 They provided 
good quality clinical services to the Swedish citizenry, and the 
system’s comprehensive character had generated substantial 
improvements in overall population health.40
On the other hand, however, this public clinic model also had 
a number of dysfunctional dimensions.41 It could be difficult 
to see the same physician on a subsequent visit, reducing 
continuity of care especially for chronically ill elderly. 
Scheduled appointments often required two week waiting 
times. Primary care clinics were only open Monday-Friday 
during regular business hours – when many patients had to be 
at work themselves. Citizens were forced by catchment areas 
to receive care at an assigned primary care center near their 
residence. There also were numerous bureaucratic obstacles 
to obtaining care, for instance telephone access hours were 
tightly restricted, typically to only one hour in the morning.
In 1991, a newly elected center-right national government 
introduced the Huslakare Act, which enabled citizens to sign 
up with one primary care doctor working in their publicly 
operated primary health center, creating an individual patient-
doctor relationship inside the publicly operated primary care 
system.42 Then Minister of Health Bo Könberg believed that 
such a “house doctor” system would improve continuity of 
care and patient compliance, enhance quality of care, and thus 
improve clinical outcomes. It also would improve the publicly 
operated medical system’s responsiveness to patients and thus 
patient satisfaction. While several counties chose to introduce 
aspects of this approach, a number of county councils were 
resistant to it. 
There also were structural problems in its implementation. 
Swedish public primary care physicians worked only 40 
hours per week (in contrast to private primary care doctors 
who often work 50 or more hours per week), and, further, 
were often not available to see patients due to continuing 
education courses and collaborative work with schools, 
nursing homes, and other social welfare institutions. Thus 
patients sometimes had to see other physicians when they 
needed an appointment, reducing the continuity of care that 
the new model was intended to provide. This problem was 
especially problematic for the large and growing number of 
elderly in Sweden, many with one or more chronic conditions 
whose treatment relied on regular visits, and who often found 
themselves still having to explain their condition again to a 
new and unfamiliar doctor.
In 1995, after the return of a Social Democratic government, 
Parliament withdrew the enabling legislation. Several counties, 
however, chose to keep the changed arrangements already in 
place, and even to continue further implementation.35,43
A.2. The Current Reform
Starting in 2007, five separate county councils sought to 
strengthen their primary care system by introducing increased 
patient choice of private as well as publicly managed primary 
care providers,40 adopting an organizational approach that 
was broadly consistent with Reform model/pattern #3 above. 
In 2010, a subsequent center-right government systematized 
this process through national legislation which required that 
all of the now-21 county councils (several having merged 
into regional bodies) allow private primary care practices to 
be established, and fund those practices on a contract basis, 
tied to the number of patients they saw.34,40 This Act on 
System of Choice in the Public Sector (in Swedish, Lag on 
Valfrihetssystem, LOV) was implemented on January 1, 2010. 
Unlike the unsuccessful reform in the early 1990s, however, 
the new law had to be more flexible, since different counties 
had already introduced somewhat different arrangements. 
Moreover, the individual’s right to choose was to select their 
health center, rather than an individual physician.35 This 
helped sidestep some of the organizational dilemmas that the 
prior reform had faced.
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Eight months after the national reform was implemented, 
an overall total of 223 new primary care centers had been 
established across all Swedish counties as a result of the 
reform process, representing an increase of 23% in the total 
number of facilities.44 Anell40 reports that the total number 
of primary care providers has increased by 20%, with more 
private providers being established in Sweden’s three large 
urban conurbations. A study in 2012 of available statistics 
found that a full 50% of all primary care visits in Sweden took 
place in non-public practices.45
There also have been several academic studies which indicate 
that the number of people who have taken contact with 
primary care doctors has increased,46 with a higher proportion 
of the increase in urban areas and among individuals with 
above average incomes.40 Thus far, there is little indication 
that overall quality of primary care services has changed.40 
Despite the rapid roll-out of the national reform, however, 
this major organizational shift was accompanied by several 
structural problems. These reflected the fact that the national 
government had not written into the legislation restrictions 
on the type of private entity that could own and/or operate 
these new primary care practices. 
As the process went forward, several unexpected developments 
occurred. The first was that fewer publicly employed primary 
care doctors than anticipated took the leap of leaving public 
employment to set up their own private practice. Unwilling 
to exchange their existing income security for a business loan 
from a bank, some existing primary care doctors chose not to 
set up their own practices (Calltorp J,  oral communication, 
August 2013).
In turn, this opened the private primary care field to two 
particular types of private sector competitors. The first was 
the relatively small number of existing private primary care 
doctors established within Praktikertjanst, a private not-
for-profit cooperative that helped private physicians run 
their practices and provided them with pension-related 
arrangements. The second was private for-profit firms, 
including “risk-capital” funds, that saw the new structure 
of private primary care as a good investment opportunity 
(Calltorp J,  oral communication, August 2013).35,40 The 
dilemma has been that these risk-capitals funds commit 
to building up primary care practices, but only in order to 
sell them at a profit within the funds’ usual 5-year window 
to repay their investors. Moreover, these risk-capital funds 
are themselves not regulated by the public sector, as they do 
not issue stock and are not listed on the (publicly regulated) 
Swedish stock exchange (Calltorp J,  oral communication, 
August 2013). Thus some of the new private sector owners of 
primary care practices are not committed to the type of stable 
long-term management that has been shown to enhance the 
quality of primary care.47
A.3. Implications for Health Sector Governance 
Looking back at these developments, it is valuable to consider 
how the overall structure of meso-level governance changed in 
Swedish primary care as a result of this structural reform. The 
intentional actions of the five initial county governments and 
then of the national government in instituting compulsory 
legislation for all counties and regions served to introduce 
a new, separate, and, while still governmentally regulated, 
more independent form of decision-making in these newly 
established private primary health centers. As the definition 
of meso-level governance above suggests, authority became 
shared between government and non-governmental actors, 
with substantial areas of decision-making leaving public 
sector hands. As a result, decisions that had clear overall 
governance implications – where to locate new primary care 
centers, for example, or whether to utilize a less-transparent 
form of ownership (risk-capital) or not – moved outside of 
formal government into various types of civil society (eg, 
non-public) entities and actors. 
The results of this shift in meso-level governance responsibility 
appear in a variety of places, including the research results 
finding that more urban than rural centers were opened 
as part of the reform, and that proportionally more above-
average income individuals utilized these new structures. 
While the equity dimensions of these location decisions 
would require additional analysis (primary care in some fast-
growing urban areas has been less available than in other fixed 
or shrinking population rural areas), meso-level governance 
decisions have clearly had policy as well as managerial 
implications as a result of the changed ownership and/or 
management structure for primary health centers. While this 
shared approach to governance raises questions about ceding 
democratic levers of control in terms of traditional Swedish 
welfare state norms,48,49 the shared action of multiple public 
and private actors as part of welfare state services can also be 
viewed as expanding rather than contracting society’s zone of 
democratic action.50
Overall, it would appear that the Swedish national 
government’s role in the governance process around the 2010 
System of Choice reform of primary care had several quite 
different dimensions. On the positive side, it achieved its 
objective of diversifying the supply of primary care services, 
and established individual choice of type of provider as 
a normal part of Swedish life. For those who believe that 
continuity of care and individual choice are essential to 
effective primary care, then the stewardship element of the 
governance equation was reflected in improved quality of 
services.
On the less positive side, however, the emergence of some 
new primary care owners who lack normal accountability 
standards, and may also lack transparency regarding 
their objectives and strategy, raises a different side of the 
governance equation. Academics may debate whether the 
lack of accountability and transparency was necessary to 
achieve the improvement in terms of choice and continuity. 
Many politicians, however, would not be surprised at the 
governance tradeoffs that rapid change in service providers 
appeared to require.51 
B. Establishing Semi-autonomous Hospitals in Spain
B.1. Introduction
Spain was transformed from an authoritarian, centralist 
regime to a democratic ‘federal-like system without federation’ 
state, when power over a number of policy sectors including 
health was devolved by the 1978 Constitution to 17 regional 
governments (Comunidades Autónomas).52 All public health 
resources were merged into a tax-funded Sistema Nacional de 
Salud (SNS) offering universal coverage to all residents.53
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Given the legal and programmatic constraints on hospitals 
remaining from the Franco era (which ended in 1975), the 
development of semi-autonomous hospitals in Spain was 
a remarkable event. The new hospital models resembled 
those introduced elsewhere in Europe, seeking health 
providers’ autonomization, corporatization and, in some 
cases, privatization, while accommodating national culture 
and the political as well as legal context.54 Influenced by the 
New Public Management paradigm,2 a mix of national policy-
makers, civil servants and managers within the new SNS 
sought to modernize hospital activities, albeit with limited 
strategic vision and political support.55
Semi-autonomous hospitals were first sponsored in the mid-
1990s by the ruling Socialist Party in Andalucia. Over the 
next several years the initiative was – remarkably – accepted 
by virtually all other political forces. Slowly a spectrum of four 
hospital governance “models” (originally five) was created 
with different degrees of autonomy – for more details see.12
Public Health Enterprises (Empresas Públicas Sanitarias, 
EPS): Staff are non-statutory instead of civil servants, with 
clinicians under a performance-related payment scheme. 
There remained substantial political intervention, however, as 
the regional health minister chaired the Supervisory Board. 
Hospitals in EPS model: in Andalucía: Costa del Sol Marbella, 
Poniente, Alto Guadalquivir and Empresa de Emergencias 
Sanitarias; in Madrid: Fuenlabrada.
Foundations (Fundaciones, F): Not-for-profit organisations 
regulated by private law and with greater capacity to decide 
on the basket of services they provide and autonomy to 
choose where to invest and whether to rent or buy equipment. 
They are also free to manage their own cash-flow and to 
pay their providers directly, which allows them to negotiate 
better deals. Professional staff are non-statutory (eg, not civil 
servants). Hospitals in F model: In Madrid: Alcorcón; in 
Baleares: Manacor; in Galicia: Barbanza, Virxe da Xunqueira, 
Verín and Salnés (status abolished in July 2008). A short-
living variety of Fundaciones (now de facto abolished) were 
Public Health Foundations (Fundaciones Públicas Sanitarias, 
FPS), staffed by statutory personnel. 
Consortium (Consorcios, C): Legal entities resulting from 
merging resources from more than one public authority, 
usually the regional government and a lower local one. Staff are 
not statutory employees and hospital management typically 
enjoys autonomy to rent or buy equipment as well as to decide 
on the basket of services to offer, often supplementing a public 
basket with extra services (usually restricted to ambulatory 
care) provided to public patients covered by private health 
insurance and fully private patients. Hospitals in C model: In 
Catalonia: Maresme, Integral de Catalunya, Vic and Tarrasa; 
in Sevilla: Aljarafe -San Juan de Dios.
Administrative Concessions (Concesiones Administrativas, 
CA): A private concessionary company – usually a joint 
venture between private health insurers, health groups, 
building societies, or banks – receives a tender to build a 
hospital and – in contrast to the Private Finance Initiative 
(PFI) model in England – to manage it as well, including 
providing clinical and non-clinical services, usually with 
non-statutory staff. However in the Hospital de la Ribera 
in Alzira, the existing statutory staff was given a choice on 
whether or not to convert to non-statutory status – and its 
most important feature (capitated funding models jointly for 
hospital and primary care) had a serendipitous origin and was 
not part of any purposeful design. One controversial aspect of 
CAs is whether the company itself should keep any eventual 
surpluses/profits or whether some or all should be repaid to 
the regional department of health. Hospitals in CA model: In 
Valencia: Ribera Hospital in Alzira, Torrevieja; Marina Alta in 
Denia and Manises; in Madrid: Infanta Elena in Valdemoro.
The Instituto para el Desarrollo e Integración de la Sanidad 
(IDIS), a well-known think tank of the Spanish private health 
sector, presents the CA model in its 2015 Report as the answer 
to the current public sector funding shortage, able to provide 
the highest quality standards with lower expenditure levels. 
The report, however, also acknowledges the continuation 
of innovative public-private partnership (PPP) experiences 
in Murcia, Baleares, Cataluña, and Galicia among public 
hospitals and health technology enterprises.56
Administrative Concessions concentrate in Madrid and 
Comunidad Valenciana where currently there are 10 facilities 
under the CA model (all hospitals plus also a central lab), as 
below (Tables 1 and 2).
All together, the autonomy of the self-governed hospital 
“models” can be placed on a continuum, measured from less 
to more autonomous (from the EPS to the F, then the C and 
finally the CA).
All new models have been applied in particular to newly-
built public hospitals, freeing the initiatives from inherited 
constraints and reducing opposition from trade unions. 
The changes affected a number of essential areas and the 
corresponding tools to better govern the facility:
a.	 Financial arrangements including decisions on capital 
investments, operating expenses (budgets and capacity to 
find additional sources of revenue), ability to incur debt, 
arrange loans and retain surpluses.
b.	 Constraints in running operations, such as setting 
contracts, terms and conditions of hiring and firing 
staff; market segmentation and product and service 
specialization (eg, waiting time management).
Table 1. Facilities Under the CA Model in Madrid
Facility No. of Beds Year
Hospital Infanta Elena 117 2007
Central Lab - Madrid Region - 2010
Hospital de Torrejón 250 2011
Hospital de Móstoles 310 2012
Hospital Collado Villalba 140 2014
Abbreviation: CA, Concesiones Administrativas.
Table 2. Facilities Under the CA Model in Comunidad Valenciana
Facility No. of beds Year
Hospital de La Ribera 301 1999
Hospital de Denia 266 2006
Hospital de Torrevieja 277 2006
Hospital de Manises 354 2009
Hospital Vinalopó 230 2010
Abbreviation: CA, Concesiones Administrativas.
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c.	 Institutional arrangements such as the legal, social, 
financial, and political status of the hospital, including 
role, freedom from political interference in making 
decisions (on services, incentives/sanctions), size and 
composition of different boards, etc. as well as the 
relationships with stakeholders (authorities, professional 
organizations, unions) and accountability arrangements 
related to supervision (reporting obligations in terms of 
transparency, content, and timing), citizen and patient 
involvement.
B.2. Assessing the Evolution of Different Spanish Models
For all practical purposes, no publicly owned hospital was, 
or can ever expect to be, fully autonomous. The real-world 
issue for hospital governance strategies in the public sector 
necessarily becomes the “degree of autonomy,” and over which 
factors of institutional life. The most that public hospitals can 
aspire to is to be acknowledged as semi-autonomous, having 
a limited degree of institutional independence within clearly 
defined but rigorously enforced decision-making boundaries 
(although these can be changed by subsequently elected 
politicians). 
Some of the innovative features of the Spanish semi-
autonomous models have since been eroded by strong 
centralizing political forces, starting with the 2007 Law 
on Public Sector Contracts which explicitly reduced the 
autonomy of those schemes. 
The political polarization of the country following the 
economic crisis of 2008 has further changed the policy 
environment,57 leading to questions about the sustainability 
of the publicly run health system. The deepening of the 
pro-privatization movement in the conservative camp 
(placing new hospitals under private law in several regions) 
accompanied by a stepping back towards traditional forms 
of governance in the socialist camp (presenting virtually any 
alternative arrangement as hidden privatization) deepened 
this divide. 
One notable manifestation of polarization has been the 
absence of impartial evaluation efforts. There have been 
remarkably few studies on the relative performance of 
centrally managed hospitals vis-à-vis each of these innovative 
models or among them (it is obvious that the information 
most often exists, but it is not being made public). Public-
private mix experiences are being therefore vehemently 
discussed in Spain almost without any available study to 
assess the performance of the new centers.58 The report “Los 
Servicios Sanitarios de las CCAA. Informe 2015 (XII Informe) 
Septiembre 2015” – Regional Health Services, XII Report, 
September for example, has been issued with data from 
public documentation, published by the Spanish Ministry of 
Health; National Institute of Statistics; Centre of Sociological 
Research; and other public institutions. This is a periodical 
report that researches differences and inequalities among the 
way Spanish citizens are cared for in different parts of the 
country. The above-cited September 2015 issue deplores the 
fact that access to public health system functioning related 
data remains in practice “almost impossible” to obtain not 
only for citizens and researchers, but also for international 
institutions (mention is made that, for Spain, OECD Health 
Data 2015 only provides 2012 data) despite governments 
commitment to introduce “transparency” – even through a 
law.59
In the absence of true comparative figures, supporters of 
new governance arrangements emphasise their higher 
efficiency in using resources (beds) and in maximising the 
use of ambulatory care alternatives, with an average cost per 
unit of production that is 30% lower and adjusted human 
resources activity that is 37% higher.60 This finding is hardly 
surprising, however, given that new not-bigger-than-300-
beds hospitals tend to be smaller in size and staff numbers 
(and have a simpler case mix) than hospitals under traditional 
management. In addition, an English National Health Service 
(NHS) Confederation study trip to the Hospital de la Ribera 
in Alzira in 2011 assessed its performance positively (using 
limited data provided by the hospital, and comparing these 
to that of the Valencia region hospitals under traditional 
management). Alzira had higher patient satisfaction rates, 
lower staff absenteeism numbers, shorter average lengths of 
stay, lower waiting times and lower capitation costs.61
Notably, even less autonomous models of hospital governance, 
like the EPS, seem to achieve some positive results when 
compared with traditional management models. In Andalucia, 
the parliamentary auditing body compared an EPS (348 
beds and a population of 373 000) with a 555-bed hospital 
(providing services to 349 000 people) and concluded that the 
former had lower operational costs and staff absenteeism.62 
From the other side, critics claim that costs are much higher 
in CAs or PFI hospitals than in public managed hospitals. A 
study by the largest health trade union in Madrid argued that 
a CA or PFI bed costs €1660 per day, while in a public hospital 
the daily cost is €955.63 One of the few technically sound 
evaluations concluded that, in general, no overwhelming 
superiority of any model has been proven across all measures 
and that each legal form probably has specific advantages and 
disadvantages.64
In this context, taking advantage of the economic crisis, a 
strong process of concentration of private hospitals by means 
of mergers and acquisitions started in Spain in 2012 – in a 
rather atomized sector where in 2011, the five biggest groups 
represented only 31% of the private market, compared to 64% 
in United Kingdom and 89% in Germany.56 Private hospitals 
in Spain own 33% of beds but represent 53% of centres, with 
biggest presence in Cataluña, Madrid, and Andalucía. They 
are grouped into three clusters: independent hospitals and 
clinics (58% of mostly small hospitals and 46% of beds); 
hospital groups devoted to managing hospitals (37% of 
hospitals and 50% of beds); and hospitals belonging to private 
health insurance companies (4% of hospitals and 4% of beds). 
Concentration is explicitly understood as an unstoppable 
movement that “answers pressures for change but at the 
same time, and contrary to what would be expected, does not 
prevent the entry of new actors.” The health sector is believed 
to have to get used to “the arrival of concentration processes 
as well as to the entrance of new actors.”65
IV. Concluding Observations 
The search for new governance models for providers both 
inside and beyond the public sector, and in primary as well as 
hospital care, speaks to a growing worry about the resilience 
and sustainability of current provider arrangements generally. 
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In particular, concern has been voiced that the current 
historically inherited hospital model – in both structural and 
administrative terms – may not be sustainable and/or will be 
subject to unprecedented change.66,67
Part of this problem reflects insufficient resources to confront 
increasing demand for more sophisticated providers, 
especially in the context of weak national economies. As noted 
earlier, the desire for tight control by political actors as against 
pressure from both patients and clinical staff for greater quality 
and responsiveness creates an inherent clash of organizational 
objectives. A related issue is the resistance of some public 
providers to adopt technology-related possibilities – not only 
machines but also organizational arrangements, with specific 
emphasis concerning how services are configured and 
delivered given the limited availability of professional health 
managers.68
Several conclusions can be outlined regarding the advantages 
and disadvantages of the new governance models discussed 
above. As the examples from Spain illustrate, the creation 
of semi-autonomous hospitals triggered a series of policy 
clashes that were resolved in a rather non-explicit manner. 
However evidence also abounds that the development 
of semi-autonomous public hospital models, although 
typically established by last-minute, ad hoc, politically driven 
legislation, was genuinely meant to improve efficiency while 
overcoming the rigidity of the inherited hospital governance 
model. These publicly owned hospitals were given a broad 
spectrum of configurations, institutional autonomy and 
at least a moderate degree of internal and external market 
incentives, demonstrating that innovative governance 
arrangements do not necessarily require extensive long-term 
planning.
Viewed at a broader European level, semi-autonomous 
hospital models similar to those adopted in Spain are now 
seen as reasonably successful in a number of countries.1 These 
more flexible governance models are popular with patients 
and, although they are not innovative in everything they do, 
many have considerable discretion in such areas as financial 
incentives, hiring and firing, and patient responsiveness and 
satisfaction. Some also have input in capital development as 
well as the ability to retain their budget surplus for use in the 
next budget year, and many no longer run annual deficits. 
In primary care, recent Swedish experience suggests a 
continued need to identify a governance strategy that 
can better combine universal coverage with individually 
acceptable levels of attention and care. Similarly strong 
reform pressures on the (somewhat different) public health 
center model of primary care in Finland69 imply that a new 
governance approach may be needed for health center-based 
primary care arrangements generally.
A key unanswered question is the impact of different reform 
models on the long-term capacity of non-state and particularly 
non-profit provider institutions. In the Swedish primary care 
case, building non-state capacity was an explicit goal of the 
legislation and of its implementation. In the Spanish hospitals 
case, the growth of civil society capacity and institutions was 
a secondary, peripheral, and mostly unintentional objective. 
This difference suggests that the outcomes of these new 
governance initiatives may vary considerably in how they 
impact the overall balance between various types of public 
and private sector providers.
Beyond the noise of political battles, it is hard to foresee any 
concerted move to abolish these new models. Indeed, some 
models are explicitly seen as a transitory stepping stone 
towards a future delivery structure of which the “only known 
thing” is that it will differ considerably from the institutions 
of today.70
The continuing evolution of organizational models in both 
the Swedish and Spanish provider cases highlights, however, 
the degree to which the future of provider governance in tax-
funded European health systems will likely be shaped by the 
interface a variety of different conceptual approaches and 
political experiences at country ground level.
Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank the journal’s anonymous 
reviewers for valuable comments and suggestions on a prior 




The authors affirm that they have no financial or professional conflicts of interest 
concerning any of the organizations or information discussed in this paper.
Authors’ contributions
Both authors were equally involved in developing the concepts and finalizing 
the text of this article.
Authors’ affiliations 
1Department of Health Policy and Management, Rollins School of Public Health, 
Emory University, Atlanta, GA, USA. 2AllDMHealth, Seville, Spain.
Endnotes
[1]A note on methods. The information presented in the Swedish case study 
reflects field research in Sweden in the early 1980s by RBS, including qualitative 
research projects inside provider institutions and extensive interviews with 
political decision-makers at the institutional, county, and national levels. This 
was followed by an extended research project on the processes and outcomes 
of Swedish health system reform conducted jointly with Professor Casten von 
Otter at the Swedish Center for Working Life in Stockholm from 1986-1995. 
Subsequently RBS co-edited and wrote the final assessment chapter for a 2009 
European Observatory volume on Nordic health reform. 
[2]The information presented in the Spanish case study reflects extensive 
research, management, and consulting work conducted over 30 years by AD, 
which crystallized in the writing of the two volumes of “Health in Transition” 
series on Spain (2006 and 2010, the first as leading author and the second one 
as co-author) of the European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies, 
Brussels, as well as a 2011 review with Arturo Alvarez on the structure of health 
reform in Spanish hospitals, published in a 2011 volume on public hospital 
governance.
[3]References to both the Swedish and Spanish research just noted are provided 
in the text and in the bibliography at the end of this article. Additional references 
from other publications for specific aspects of both the Swedish and Spanish 
cases are cited in the text and referenced in the bibliography.
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